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they claimed that explanation consists in argumentation and, in particular, in derivation. I

strongly recommend Wesley Salmon’s (1989) locus classicus

,

in which he describes the impact of this article as well as the objections that the

DN model encountered during the following 40 or so years.

In contrast to mere generalizations and correlations, lawful regularity supports

. Natural laws can account for what would have happened if something were

not the case. Among the uncritically held assumptions implied in the understanding of

explanation as inference, or explanation as derivation, is that no explanation can allow

clauses. If the lawful regularity in the major premise must be universal, and the

entailment strict, this precludes any modifying clauses in the major premise to the effect that

“This is so (only) all things being equal.” So all particularities, all contextual nuances, are

removed and dismissed from the logic of explanation as irrelevant. Since, as we just noted,

deduction allows retrodiction as well as prediction, the arrow of time and multiple

realizability are also removed from metaphysics as strict one-to-one determinism is assumed:

given A, B (and only B) inexorably and necessarily follows. There are therefore no

probabilistic or statistical laws. In later years Hempel modified this original view to try to

make room for a deductive statistical model of explanation, but in the end he concluded that

statistical reasoning is only used when the details of the law are not known. There is no

objective possibility of either indeterminism or a probabilistic of a stochastic nature.

Statistical explanations are thus merely stop-gap measures, quasi-explanations that reflect our

ignorance and do not capture reality. And in none of these authors is there even a hint of

mereological goings-on: any relationship between parts and wholes and wholes and parts is

strictly one way, bottom up, with the resulting whole being nothing more than an aggregate

that can be reduced to the sum of its components. Qualitatively novel properties at the

macroscopic level are merely epiphenomena and are easily ignored. So, assuming a

deductive-nomological explanatory schema and the strict mechanism and determinism it

implies, there remains no possible way of acknowledging a qualitatively novel wholeness or

coherence or cohesiveness that arises from the interactions among erstwhile independent but

now interrelated and connected parts. According to the received view of explanation, strong

mereological relations are impossible. As a result, radical or strong emergence cannot occur.

One can say that what all these Science 1.0 approaches to explanation share is the

dismissal of what might be called adventitious roots, the dismissal of the indeterminate, the

particular, the contextual, the temporal, and the unique, and therefore the dismissal of

anything having to do with praxis or cultures, or traditions, or history. Although the form of

explanation changes from mythology to science, from an explicit genealogy of the hero and

the city, and of the authority of the storyteller, to that of scientific and philosophical logic,

nonetheless the notion that the temporal, the sensory, and the phenomenal are to be explained

by derivation from the eternal, unchanging, universal, and non-phenomenal continues by and

large unabated from the era of mythology to today. It is not until complexity theory and our

understanding of sensitivity to initial conditions and non-linearity, and the recent capability to

model, visualize, and simulate non-linear dynamical phenomena on computers, that

philosophy and science have begun to break away from explanations that are required to trace

the natural phenomena under investigation to their origin in what I have called the divine.

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